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1 The status of capacity
development for governance
Massively increased aid flows will meet an ongoing
reformprocess inAfrica.The process of governance
reforms is not new – in fact it can be traced back
to the 1980 Lagos Plan of Action. Recently it has
been reinvigorated, as it has benefited from the
parallel support of the African states and the G8
group since the Kananaskis Summit in 2002. It is
characterised by the recognition that African states
claim and accept the principal responsibility for
their social and political transition and reform
processes. This consensus has found its clearest
expression in the reform of the AfricanUnion and
the creation of various mechanisms such as the
New Partnership for African Development’s
(NEPAD)African peer review mechanism (APRM),
as well as regional and sub-regional initiatives.These
initiatives are in the process of being implemented,
and progress is visible in many fora, but it is too
early for impacts to be shown at the national level
where theMillenniumDevelopment Goals (MDGs)
aremeasured. Initiatives are also being better linked
to national or regional civil society capacities that
are needed to drive these reforms from below.
These initiatives as well as the Cotonou
partnership of the EuropeanUnion permit amore
fruitful dialogue among and within African states
on governance issues which in turn may help to
put governance work on amore sound footing. In
parallel, donors are currently pursuing joint and
separate activities to strengthen the sustainability
and the impact of instruments such as the Poverty
Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), mostly in the
areas of public administration and public financial
management in general and,more particularly, in
supervision, control and auditing. In the policy
cluster of safety and security, the first steps for
common strategies and action have successfully
been taken on the sub-regional level.
The national picture for governance activities is
very varied. Similar sector-wide approaches (SWAp)
on law and justice in neighbouring countries have
had quite different trajectories in recent times (e.g.
Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania). Other equally
demanding reformprocesses allowing participation
in policy analysis and development (e.g. on budget
reforms) have not reached the status of institutional
deepening, let alone of sustained application.More
fundamental issues of cooperation with countries
that show less favourable framework conditions
have not yet been tackled with the necessary resolve.
These processes have succeeded in building up
some capacity. They have allowed African
governments and citizens to have a greater say in
the way their countries are involved in international
efforts for better governance. Increased aid flows
will necessarily lead to substantive changes in
incentives and, above all, in relations of power and
influence given the concomitant changes in
structures and relations that shape the political
process.
Budget-financed programmes of the SWAp and
PRSP type cover many sectors and levels, and have
led to an increasingly complex reform architecture.
One case in point is decentralisation, one of the
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reforms that is thought to unleash capacities and
to bring policy making closer to civil society.
Decentralisation processes deal primarily with
functional and territorial reform issues. But they
involvemany other areas such as civil service reform
as they try to combine “downsizing” and
“rightsizing” of national and sub-national
organisations. These reform aspects becomemore
urgent as the measure of capacity needed on the
local level becomes apparent and the multiple
requests to increase jobs at this level have to be
addressed.
Another major reform area for decentralisation
is the transfer, sharing and generation of revenues.
Broadening tax bases for the local level and
improving revenue flows through responsible and
legitimate government are essential parts of these
reforms. They are particularly sensitive to changes
in the availability of funds.
Accounting and auditing are reform areas, linked
to decentralisation but following its own rationale.
In weak policy and management environments,
both stress the repressive part of auditing and thus
are of little help to newly decentralised organisations
groping with new tasks. They have not factored in
roles for the private sector or decentralised internal
audit institutions in a decentralised environment.
Nor can they take into consideration emerging
instruments and practice for public administration
supervision and control in a decentralised
environment.
If decentralisation is to have any effect on poverty
reduction, civil society needs to get involved in policy
analysis, policy making and in exercising some
measure of “social control”. There are many very
positive experiences in this area, but also many
cases where misguided accountability did not
improve the quality of public services but disrupted
public administration decisionmaking.Moreover,
mechanisms of accountability across levels of
government and the coordination between internal
control and external accountability take a long time
to mature.
These reforms are lengthy, costly and involve almost
every part of society. They do not, by their nature, lend
themselves to an acceleration brought about by outside
influence. The reasons are well known. Programmes
are in reality a host of different reform processes
that are driven by different micro-motives, which
depend on different coalitions of actors and involve
different resources. Increased fund flows are liable
to change the balance of power and relations
between reform actors that are driving the process
and the direction the reform process takes. The
chances that the impact of changed incentives can
bemanaged appear rather slim.On the other hand,
the risk that increased fund flows will interfere with
emerging democratic processes are all too apparent.
While it may be theoretically easy to increase
spending by increasing the number of spending
and accounting entities (local governments,
autonomous authorities, etc.) using additional funds
to produce reform results would require well-
established systems of commonly accepted rules,
buttressed by a common profile of civil servants,
for example based on a common induction and
public sector training, similar recruitment
procedures and career paths.
2 The time factor
TheCommission for Africa report puts it succinctly
in its summary: ‘Building capacity needs time and
commitment’. But time is a precious commodity,
especially for donors, as they pursue their strategies
and programmes in rapid succession. The chances
that these programmes will tend to supersede each
other, regardless of their implementation, are not
remote.
The Kananaskis G8 African Action Plan 2002
reads:
NEPAD recognizes that the prime responsibility
for Africa’s future lies with Africa itself.We will
continue to support African efforts to encourage
public engagement in the NEPAD and we will
continue to consult with our African partners
on how we can best assist their own efforts.G8
governments are committed to mobilize and
energize global action, marshal resources and
expertise, and provide impetus in support of the
NEPAD’s objectives. As G8 partners, we will
undertake mutually reinforcing actions to help
Africa accelerate growth andmake lasting gains
against poverty …
We will continue to maintain a constructive
dialogue with our African partners in order to
achieve effective implementation of our Action
Plan and to support the objectives of theNEPAD.
We will take the necessary steps to ensure the
effective implementation of our Action Plan and
will review progress at our next Summit based
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on a final report from our Personal
Representatives for Africa.
Patience is obviously running short, and on the
Gleneagles G8 website 2005 – under the heading
of FAQ – we find the following statement: ‘Progress
has beenmade by theG8 and throughNEPAD, but
we are aware there is still more to be done. We
believe it is crucial that the international community
gets behind the Africa-led agenda’.
Recognition of the progress is not linked to the
achievement of any specific results or the reports
of African organisations on the achievement of
results, let alone impacts. But the site provides an
answer to those who might question the timing of
new initiatives before “old” initiatives have been
taken on board and had time to mature:
The timing of theCommission’s work is intended
to seize 2005 as an opportunity to make a
difference for Africa. 2005 will see the
coincidence of the United Kingdom’s
chairmanship of both theG8 and, in the second
half of the year, the EuropeanUnion, withAfrica
high on both agendas.
Reconciling the timing of new programmes, such
as that of the Commission for Africa and ongoing
capacity development processes, needs urgent
attention. Requirements of participation and
accountability, of monitoring and reporting that
are usually key elements of successive programmes,
will hardly receive attention if all actors tacitly accept
that they will soon be overridden.
Moreover, to determine time requirements is a
difficult task indeed. It takes time to introduce and
implement new concepts of good governance into
the public sector. But these concepts generally
depend on civil society organisations developing,
accepting and embracing these concepts. All this
in turn depends very much on the inherent
dynamics of these organisations to achieve, for
example, ameasure of accountability in its statutes,
in its decision-making procedures and other actions.
Only to the extent that these are robust enough to
withstand incentives that push towards quick action
will they be in a position to claim aminimal degree
of transparency and accountability.
An interesting illustration of the function of time
for reforms has been provided by the Permanent
Secretary in charge of the Tanzanian civil service.
He suggested that one possible explanation of the
success of civil service reform in that country that
won general praise, is the pursuit of principles and
ideas that date back to theNyerere administration.
These principles had been superseded originally
by a contradictory practice. They are now bearing
fruit as the generation that was most active during
the 1970s has risen to the top.1 The gestation period
may be shorter in many cases. But the example
demonstrates the time horizons and the risks
involved in determining the time periods required
to expect outcomes in areas that are notoriously
difficult to influence, tomonitor andmeasure. Since
time is of the essence for highly geared support
programmes, there is a need to pursue capacity
development in the teeth of adverse timing.
New initiatives funded by additional aid may
give short shrift to many achievements that have
been introduced in recent years – beginning with
gender-sensitive approaches to reforms, passing on
to the mainstreaming of anti-corruption
mechanisms,2 and to supporting human rights-
based approaches of service delivery. Will these
considerations that took a long time to lock into
the methods and instruments of donors and
recipients alike, need to yield as they stand in the
way of speedy spending to attain theMDGs?
3 Opportunities
‘Without progress in governance, all other reforms will
have limited impact’, the report of the Commission
for Africa tells us. This lesson has been repeated
over and over again. But the report misses the point
– because it assumes that capacity development for
governance is adiscrete streamof activities, ancillary
to and accompanying other reforms.One gets the
impression that infrastructure and other investment
programmes can be successfully implemented
without governance capacity. Or the necessary
capacity can be created andmanaged with the help
of added technical assistance projects, as was the
habit during the times of structural/sectoral
adjustment programmes.
In a different vein, the report states that
governance capacity building is essentially a
domestic task for recipient governments, in contrast
to infrastructure, which is considered a fitting task
for donors.
With the help of increased aid, this logicmay be
reversed. Issues of public sector reform could be
addressed on amajor scale, and that could help the
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public sector recover from thedeficits that havebeen
plaguing it since the time of structural adjustment.
Then the public sector was often considered to be
unable to perform even minimal functions. Its
capacity shrank as austerity ate into the budgets
available for public service pay and operations.
Downsizing ensured that those who could find jobs
abroador in theprivate sector went there, if they had
not joined donors in the first place.Downsizing also
burdened thepublic sector withheavy futurepension
obligations.Massively increased aid could be used
to make capacity development for governance a
central concern of donors.
4 Capacity: the donor problem
The argument for making the public sector a target
for increased aid becomes apparent by comparing
the following two statements. The report of the
Commission for Africa puts it traditionally:
Africa’s history over the last fifty years has been
blighted by two areas of weakness. These have
been capacity – the ability to design and deliver
policies; and accountability – how well a state
answers to its people. Improvements in both are
first and foremost the responsibility of African
countries and people.
And then it continues: ‘But action by rich nations
is essential too’.
Compare that with this comment: ‘Thus, state
building is not an act of simple charity but a smart
investment in the United States’ own safety and
stability’ (Eizenstat et al.).
If we take “state building” as the latest
euphemism for developing governance capacity, a
major increase in aid can help us conceive of the
state and its capacity as amajor donor problem that
needs to be tackled with the highest priority, rather
than a constraint on greater donor effectiveness to
be left with partner governments.Closing our eyes
to the recent history of the civil service, especially
in countries with weak institutions, cannot be a
recipe for effective capacity creation for reaching
theMDGs.While responsibility for governance has
of course to remain with the African people, the
ways in which governance capacities can be
developed need to be given a fresh look by all of
those that feel bound by theMDGs.3
We look at increased aid not as a new “Marshall
Plan for Africa” but rather as a “big push” that allows
us to reconsider some current thinking – for
example, about the task of “reinventing” the post-
colonial state in Africa; in particular for those
countries that are usually classified as aid dependent.
This is certainly not a game developed countries
should be watching from the sidelines – especially
since for geopolitical reasons, attention is now
focused on states and governance as crucial to the
maintenance of world order. A joint endeavour in
support of governance may also assist donors in
developing a more integrated and eventually
coherent view of the numerous and varied arenas
necessary to build capacity – taking into account
the globalised environment for African governance.4
Increased aid can help to put the issue of
increased capacities at the centre of development
cooperation policies. Making donors understand
that capacity creation andmanagement is a crucial
problem, and not a constraint on well-intentioned
sector activities, would be a great advance.
Ever since it has been introduced as an issue into
the development discourse, governance was
consideredmore of a diversion, an add-on to other
more substantive reforms. Governance did not
promote or realize sector goals directly.What’s more,
governance principles did not contribute to more
capacity. The MDGs are a case in point. Their
objectives have been set in isolation. And they are
pursued and can be reached in a way neglecting
organisational and societal processes and by the
same token processes of capacity development.The
MillenniumDeclaration cannot create the intrinsic
link between theMillenniumGoals and the capacity
and principles required to reach them.
Reforming the public sector to maintain or
increase capacities appeared to be an obstacle
blocking the road to progress in many if not all
public goods and services. When structural
adjustment was still the flavour of the day and when
big lenders realised that they had not really an
“adjustment” but a reform issue at hand, they
chipped in rather randomly designed programmes
to improve the state’s ability to deliver public health,
education, and economic reform but also balanced
budgets,market-led pricing systems, and privatised
enterprises. With few exceptions the question of
how to manage change by creating the necessary
capacity was not put on the agenda.Constraints of
institutions that designed and managed policies
were not really taken seriously because the policies
were delivered ready to be used.
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Today, this perspective has not changed explicitly.
New funds should be an opportunity to put into
practice some of the lessons that have been learned
since the end of the 1990s.
5 A competitive yet principled
public sector
Milton Friedman said a couple of years ago that
his advice to former socialist countries 10 years
earlier had been to ‘privatise, privatise, privatise.’
‘But I was wrong,’ he added. ‘It turns out that
the rule of law is probably more basic than
privatisation. (Fukuyama 2004: 36)
To achieve the MDGs, donors will have to
understand that aprincipled and competitive public
sector is crucial. Increased capacities and the
promotion of good public administration principles
have to go hand in hand. And one of the major
underlying factors is a public service that is
competitive. It needs to be given the resources to
operate on equal footing with the private sector.
The public sector should not be forced – or tempted
– to use other means, notably its link to political
power, to mobilise influence and funds.
Increased aid will make a difference by helping
to attract and retain well-trained and well-paid
personnel to the public sector. Since this exercise
will have to go hand in hand with providing services
in various sectors, several methods of delivery may
serve this purpose.
1. A transitional build-up of parallel capacities with
at its centre strategies of capacity reform and
deployment:
(a) additional/parallel capacities linked to specific
sectors but reinforcing general structures and
set up in accordance with rules of general validity
– no social fund-type operations that do not
report to the government hierarchy
(b) generalised upgrading of existing capacity
(c)making the public sector ethos a central issue.
2. A special programme to revamp public sector
human resources:
(d) increasing civil services’ status and reputation
– a determined effort of staff retention – and, in
parallel
(e) redirecting human resources that have been
poached by the international private sector – a
reversal of the brain drain
(f) improving access to careers from where
students are
(g) creating structures that can direct these
capacities to the main areas of need – active
personnel management.
3. Creating a host of service centres that are able
to support additional management tasks of local
government or of civil society organisations –
acting as midwives or as strategic managers,
pursuing transparent policies and incentives.
In dealing with these structures, one should be
aware of two principles: do not separate policies
from implementation and do not centralise policy
management.Consider externally created capacity
centres as an integral part of the publicmanagement
landscape of the country within which they operate.
Consider them as actors with interests and the
resources to pursue them. But make sure that they
are bound by and respond to values and principles
that are guiding the public sector in its entirety, and
which distinguish the sector and its service from
others. Or conversely, respond to their demands
for systems that ensure their integration into a
common framework whichmight be virtual in the
beginning, but which would gain more substance
over time.
Management capacity is a scarce resource.Thus,
increased aid should provide themeans to improve
capacity management skills, in a generalised fashion,
across the entire public sector. Otherwise we will
again create small islands in a sea of incompetence
and indifference. Such meagre improvements are
neither sustainable nor significant for reaching
ambitious goals such as theMDGs.
Advocating parallel structures – the capacity
centres described above – is a risky business. The
history of these entities driving the social investment
funds of the 1990s is full of examples where parallel
structures have put in peril weak public sector
institutions. In order to counter these evident risks,
transfer and exit strategies need to be put in place
and monitored. But strategies of this kind have
always been part and parcel of capacity
development. In this new context, they are essential
to guarantee the feasibility of this strategy.
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Notes
1. Conversation with Joseph A. Rugumyamheto, April
2002.
2. As a reminder of how difficult it is to pursue anti-cor-
ruption activities, compare the observations regarding
the UK’s performance implementing the Anti-Bribery
Convention, Financial Times, 19 March 2005.
3. This idea has been suggested to the author by Dele
Olowu, adviser to the African Development Bank.
4. For a start it is helpful to consider arenas such as trade,
migration, intellectual property protection, investment
and financial transactions.
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